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ABSTRACT 
 
The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services relies 
upon the Federal Bureau of Investigation to administer the 
National Name Check Program, which conducts 
background checks on applicants for naturalization.  
Backlogs have led to long delays for aspiring citizens and 
significant legal problems for the government.  
This iBrief examines the First Circuit’s ruling in 
Aronov v. Napolitano that an eighteen-month delay in 
adjudicating a naturalization application was substantially 
justified.  While the government’s inefficiency can be 
explained partly by an understaffed bureaucracy, 
overwhelming evidence suggests that these problems are 
exacerbated by a technological infrastructure that is ill-
equipped to handle the scope of the backlog. This iBrief 
argues that the government should be held liable for its 
failures; and that long-overdue technological 
improvements should be implemented to prevent these 
issues from recurring in the future. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 In June 2009, the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services (USCIS) announced that it had cleared the FBI National 
Name Check Program (NNCP) backlog, seemingly putting an end 
to a problem that had plagued USCIS in recent years.2
                                                     
1 Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected 2011; Middlebury College, 
A.B. 2008.  I would like to thank Professor Hans Christian Linnartz for his 
helpful guidance in writing this iBrief. 
  The 
optimism of this announcement, however, belies major concerns: 
Has the government solved the problem, or merely forestalled a 
2 Press Release, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCIS, FBI 
Eliminate National Name Check Backlog (June 22, 2009), available at 
http://www.uscis.gov/files/article/NNCP_backlog_elim_22jun09.pdf. 
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crisis?  Is the government technologically competent to handle the 
increased demand which could produce another such backlog?  Is 
it “substantially justified” in causing delays in the adjudication of 
adjustment of status and naturalization applications?3
¶2 In 2009, Acting USCIS Ombudsman Richard E. Flowers 
declared that he “no longer considers FBI name checks to be a 
pervasive and serious problem.”
 
4
I. THE NAME-CHECK PROCESS 
  After Aronov, however, it is 
clear that FBI name checks continue to stymie the naturalization 
process in the United States.  This iBrief analyzes Aronov in light 
of the USCIS’s and the FBI’s efforts to combat a serious 
technological challenge, and will show that the government’s 
response is not legally defensible because of its equally serious 
technological shortcomings. 
A. Technology 
¶3 The NNCP reviews the FBI’s files for background 
information about individuals and provides it to various 
government agencies including the USCIS, which uses the 
program to vet applicants for naturalization.5
The name is electronically checked against the FBI 
Universal Indices (UNI).  The searches seek all instances of 
the individual’s name and close date of birth, whether a 
main file name or reference. . . . [A] main file name is that 
of an individual who is, himself, the subject of an FBI 
investigation, whereas a reference is someone whose name 
appears in an FBI investigation. . . . The names are 
searched in a multitude of combinations, switching the 
order of first, last, middle names, as well as combinations 
with just the first and last, first and middle, and so on.  It 
also searches different phonetic spelling variations of the 
names, [which is] especially important considering that 
  The name check 
proceeds as follows: 
                                                     
3 Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
4 2009 USCIS OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP. 35, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/cisomb_annual_report_2009.pdf. 
5 Foreign Travel to the United States: Testimony Before the H. Comm. On Gov. 
Reform, 108th Cong. 2 (2003) (statement of Robert J. Garrity, Jr., Assistant 
Director, Records Management Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation), 
available at 2003 WL 21608243. 
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many names in our indices have been transliterated from a 
language other than English. 
If there is a match with a name in a FBI record, it is 
designated as a “Hit,” meaning that the system has stopped 
on a possible match with the name being checked, but now 
a human being must review the file or indices entry to 
further refine the names “Hit” on. . . . 
Approximately 85% of name checks are electronically 
returned as having “No Record” within 72 hours.  A “No 
Record” indicates that the FBI's Central Records System 
contains no identifiable information regarding to [sic] this 
individual. . . . A secondary manual name search usually 
identifies an additional 10% of the requests as having a “No 
Record,” for a 95% overall “No Record” response rate. . . . 
The remaining 5% are identified as possibly being the 
subject of an FBI record.  The FBI record must now be 
retrieved and reviewed. . . . The information in the file is 
reviewed for possible derogatory information.  Less than 
1% of the requests are identified with an individual with 
possible derogatory information.  These requests are 
forwarded to the appropriate FBI investigative division for 
further analysis.6
¶4 This system, which has its origins in the Eisenhower 
administration as a means of vetting prospective federal 
employees, was placed under immense strain in the aftermath of 
the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, when new immigration-
related security programs caused the volume of name-check 
requests to grow dramatically.
 
7 Before September 11, the NNCP 
handled approximately 2.5 million name checks annually; after the 
attacks, in fiscal years 2002 and 2003, that number grew to 3.2 
million and 5.6 million respectively.8
B. The NNCP Backlog 
 
¶5 By May 2007, the USCIS was overwhelmed, facing “a 
staggering 329,160 FBI name check cases pending, with 
approximately 64 percent (211,341) of those cases pending more 
                                                     
6 Id. at 3–4. 
7 Id. at 2–3. 
8 Id. at 2. 
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than 90 days and approximately 32 percent (106,738) pending 
more than one year.”9  The agency considered a number of 
solutions to this backlog, including the implementation of a 
Background Check Service (BCS) which would track the status of 
security checks in pending applications.10
USCIS has limited capability to produce reports 
detailing the status of long-pending FBI name check cases. 
In addition, USCIS systems do not automatically indicate 
when a delayed name check is complete and the case can 
be adjudicated. Often, this leads to a situation where the 
validity of other checks expire before USCIS reviews the 
case.
  As USCIS Ombudsman 
Prakash Khatri explained in the 2007 annual report to Congress: 
11
¶6 The 2007 report also stated the need for tools including 
“wrap-around” or “wrap-back” security checks, which are “real 
time security updates from the law enforcement community on 
applicants who violate criminal laws.”
 
12  Such a system would 
give the USCIS access to updated data about a person’s criminal 
record without the need for additional name checks.13  The report 
noted, however, that “it appears that USCIS is focused on 
providing the FBI name check program with resources, rather than 
concentrating on the necessary wrap-back service.”14
¶7 Indeed, the USCIS chose to commit additional resources to 
the NNCP, allowing the FBI to increase its personnel; “[m]ost of 
the improvements in name check processing times and the 
reductions in the backlogs have resulted from this increase in 
resources and personnel.”
 
15
                                                     
9 2007 USCIS OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP. 37, available at 
  The BCS, which was already overdue 
when it was described in the 2007 report, had not been 
implemented by the publication of the 2008 report, and was not 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOMB_Annual%20Report_2007.pdf. 
10 Id. at 43. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 57. 
13 Id. at 57–58. 
14 Id. at 58. 
15 2008 USCIS OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP. 7, available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/CISOMB_Annual_Report_2008.pdf. 
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mentioned in the 2009 report.16  Similarly, the USCIS in 2008 was 
still operating without wrap-around security checks; the 
Ombudsman stated “that it does not expect this feature to be 
available in the near future.”17
II. THE DECISION IN ARONOV V. NAPOLITANO 
 
¶8 Besides illustrating the shortcomings of employing the 
FBI’s NNCP in the naturalization process, an analysis of Aronov 
and its case history reveals that the USCIS was not substantially 
justified in its tardiness in processing a naturalization application 
pending an FBI name check.  Given the predictable slowness of the 
process and the aforementioned technological unpreparedness of 
the USCIS, the government should not have violated the applicable 
statute by imposing an unnecessary delay. 
A. Facts 
¶9 In May 2004, Alexandre Aronov, a Russian native and U.S. 
legal permanent resident, applied for U.S. citizenship.18  In 
February 2005, the USCIS interviewed Mr. Aronov without 
receiving a “full criminal background check” from the FBI, despite 
the agency’s own regulation that such an examination may be 
undertaken only after conducting such a check.19  Mr. Aronov was 
told that he could not be naturalized until the check was complete, 
even though he was entitled by statute to adjudication of his 
application within 120 days of the interview.20  In 2006, after more 
than eighteen months, he filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Massachusetts, demanding action on his application.21
                                                     
16 2007 USCIS OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 37; 2008 USCIS 
OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP., supra note 15, at 7; 2009 USCIS OMBUDSMAN ANN. 
REP., supra note 4. 
  
The government settled the case and moved to remand to the 
17 2008 USCIS OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP., supra note 15, at 45. 
18 Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84, 87 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc). 
19 Id.; see 8 C.F.R. § 335.2(b) (“The [USCIS] will notify applicants for 
naturalization to appear before a [USCIS] officer for initial examination . . . only 
after the Service has received a definitive response from the [FBI] that a full 
criminal background check of an applicant has been completed.”). 
20 Aronov, 562 F.3d at 87; see 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006) (“If there is a failure to 
make a determination . . . before the end of the 120-day period after the date on 
which the examination is conducted . . . the applicant may apply to the United 
States district court for the district . . . for a hearing on the matter.”). 
21 Aronov, 562 F.3d at 86. 
2010 DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW No. 007 
USCIS so that the agency could grant him citizenship.  The district 
court granted the motion, and Mr. Aronov was naturalized later 
that year.  Mr. Aronov subsequently applied for attorney’s fees for 
his mandamus action under Section 2412 of the Equal Access to 
Justice Act (EAJA); according to this provision, a plaintiff is 
entitled to such fees unless the government was “substantially 
justified” in its position.22
B. Procedural History 
 
1. The District Court’s Decision  
¶10  The district court awarded attorney’s fees to Mr. Aronov, 
holding that the government’s position was not “substantially 
justified” under the EAJA.23  Substantial justification is defined as 
an explanation which has a “reasonable basis in law and fact.”24  
The court noted that the government’s own internal policy 
provides for expediting the FBI name check if a mandamus action 
has been filed, and thus encourages such actions as a way to gain 
priority.25  It rejected the argument that the delay was justified by a 
backlog in the FBI’s NNCP, explaining that the delay itself, 
regardless of the agency responsible, “renders the government’s 
pre-litigation position not ‘substantially justified.’”26
¶11 The court concluded that the government’s unreasonable 
delay in completing the name check forced Mr. Aronov to sue at 
personal expense “to slightly mitigate the already unlawful delay 
in that processing.”
   
27
2. The First Circuit’s Panel Decision 
 
¶12 A divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First 
Circuit affirmed the district court.28
                                                     
22 Id.; 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
  The majority explained that 
even when applying Chevron deference to the government’s 
23 Aronov v. Chertoff, No. 06-11526-NG, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40455, at *8 
(D. Mass. January 30, 2007); The district court and the First Circuit also discuss 
whether Mr. Aronov is a “prevailing party” under the same statute, an issue 
beyond the scope of this iBrief. 
24 Id. at *5–6. 
25 Id. at *7–8. 
26 Id. (quoting Smirnov v. Chertoff, No. 06-10563-RWZ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
9598, at *9 (D. Mass. Jan. 18, 2007)). 
27 Id. at *8. 
28 Aronov v. Chertoff, 536 F.3d 30, 32 (1st Cir. 2008). 
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general policy, the court is not required to find substantial 
justification in the particular delay with Mr. Aronov’s 
application.29  The court’s “assessment of what is reasonable is 
informed by the relevant statutes and regulations,” and the 
government’s own regulation interprets the relevant statute as 
imposing 120-day deadline.30  The USCIS offered no 
“particularized justification” for noncompliance, giving only 
policy justifications for the FBI NNCP.31  Finally, the court noted 
that although the USCIS attributed the delay to the FBI name-
check backlog, the failure was caused by the agency’s premature 
and unexplained examination of Mr. Aronov in violation of its own 
regulation.32
¶13 The dissent countered that the government was 
substantially justified because the USCIS’s use of the FBI NNCP 
as part of its criminal background check “was a reasonable 
interpretation of a legislative command and that interpretation was 
committed to the agency’s expertise.”
 
33  Furthermore, it argued 
that the relevant statute did not mandate adjudication within 120 
days of Mr. Aronov’s interview, but merely established “the timing 
of suits” to encourage fast action by the USCIS.34
                                                     
29 See id. at 43; see also Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 
467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984) (“If Congress has explicitly left a gap for the 
agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority to the agency to 
elucidate a specific provision of the statute by regulation. Such legislative 
regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or 
manifestly contrary to the statute.”). 
  The majority’s 
demand for a particularized justification for the delay in Mr. 
Aronov’s case was unnecessary “because the entire point of 
30 Aronov, 536 F.3d at 44–45; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006); see also 8 
C.F.R. § 335.3(a) (“A decision . . . shall be made at the time of the initial 
examination or within 120-days after the date of the initial examination of the 
applicant for naturalization.”). 
31 Aronov, 536 F.3d at 47. 
32 Id. at 49; see also § 335.2(b). 
33 Aronov, 536 F.3d at 62 (Lynch, C.J., dissenting); § 1446(a) (“Before a person 
may be naturalized, an employee of the [USCIS] . . . shall conduct a personal 
investigation of the person applying for naturalization.”); Dep’ts of Commerce, 
Justice & State, the Judiciary & Related Agencies Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2448–49 (“[N]one of the funds appropriated or otherwise 
made available to the [USCIS] shall be used to complete adjudication of an 
application for naturalization unless the [USCIS] has received confirmation 
from the [FBI] that a full criminal background check has been completed.”). 
34 Aronov, 536 F.3d at 64–65 (Lynch, C.J., dissenting). 
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conducting name checks is that the government does not know 
what the check will uncover.”35  The dissent supports as 
reasonable the agency’s choice to “to postpone a decision on 
Aronov’s citizenship until obtaining information about whether the 
name check revealed risks to national security or public safety.”36
C. Holding 
 
¶14 The First Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed the panel 
decision and dismissed Mr. Aronov’s EAJA application.37  The 
court explained that substantial justification is not necessarily 
achieved by being legally correct, but merely by taking a position 
that a reasonable person would think is correct.38  Such was the 
case, the court reasoned, with the USCIS’s decision to include the 
NNCP as part of the required full criminal background check.39  
Although Congress did not include the NNCP in that check, the 
delegation of that choice to USCIS “is entirely sensible for a 
number of reasons, including the sometimes rapidly evolving law 
enforcement technologies.”40  Given that Congress did not 
terminate the FBI NNCP in the face of the backlog, “but rather 
provided funding to expedite the process USCIS had chosen,” the 
government’s decision to employ the NNCP was reasonable given 
Chevron deference.41
¶15 Finally, the court rejected the district court’s reasoning that 
the USCIS’s policy of expediting applications for those who file 
mandamus actions “unreasonably forces applicants to sue.”
 
42  It 
explained that the agency’s policy of giving preferential treatment 
to litigants was merely “a rational allocation of resources,” not a 
grant of a statutory right to priority in adjudicating cases.43
                                                     
35 Id. at 66–67. 
 
36 Id. at 67–68. 
37 Aronov v. Napolitano, 562 F.3d 84, 86 (1st Cir. 2009) (en banc).  Lynch, C.J., 
the dissenter in the panel decision, wrote the en banc majority opinion. 
38 Id. at 94; see also Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552, 565 (1988) 
(“[Substantially justified] is not ‘justified to a high degree,’ but rather ‘justified 
in substance or in the main’—that is, justified to a degree that could satisfy a 
reasonable person.”). 
39 Aronov, 562 F.3d at 95. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 96; see also 467 U.S. at 843. 
42 Aronov, 562 F.3d at 99. 
43 Id. 
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III. ANALYSIS 
A. The Dissents in Aronov v. Napolitano 
1. Torruella’s Dissent 
¶16 Judge Torruella’s dissent decried the majority’s willingness 
to accept “amorphous policy interests alleged by the government 
through bombastic exaggeration and doomsday predictions” 
instead of compensating Mr. Aronov for the mandamus action he 
filed to obtain citizenship.44  It argued that his modest EAJA award 
did not threaten the government’s policy, but merely recovered 
costs incurred in filing suit “after an excessive delay attributable to 
backlog and a failure to follow protocol.”45
2. Lipez’s Dissent 
 
¶17 Judge Lipez, who wrote the reversed panel opinion, pointed 
out that even if the USCIS were entitled to Chevron deference the 
government still lacked substantial justification for its eighteen-
month delay in Mr. Aronov’s application.46  Judge Lipez insisted 
that the 120 days in the relevant statute and regulation was a 
deadline, dismissing the view that such a time frame was “merely 
aspirational.”47  He argued that Congress’s adoption of the option 
of bringing suit made “such a related view” impossible, and that 
the government’s own regulation treated the 120-day period as a 
deadline.48
¶18 Judge Lipez further explained that Mr. Aronov’s premature 
interview was not an isolated error, but rather part of the USCIS’s 
“regular practice [of violating] its own regulations by examining 
candidates before receiving NNCP results” and inviting lawsuits 
by missing the subsequent deadline.
 
49  “That is an indulgent 
reasonable person,” he concludes, “who would view [such] 
conduct so benignly.”50
                                                     
44 Id. (Torruella, J., dissenting). 
 He also wrote that the USCIS was not in a 
“hopeless bind” as it claimed to be, since it could have addressed 
45 Id. at 100–01. 
46 Id. at 110 (Lipez, J., dissenting).  Judge Lipez wrote the majority opinion in 
the earlier panel decision. 
47 Id. at 111; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 335.3(a). 
48 Aronov, 562 F.3d at 111. 
49 Id. at 112. 
50 Id. 
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its national-security concerns and the 120-day deadline “in a 
manner consistent with the applicable laws and regulations.”51
B. Technological Solutions 
 
¶19 As the First Circuit noted in its original panel opinion, 
“[t]here is nothing in the language of 8 U.S.C. 1446(a) or the 1998 
Appropriations Act that requires USCIS to include the NNCP in 
the naturalization process.”52  In fact, even though the NNCP had 
already existed for decades when the relevant statutes were 
enacted, Congress made no provision for it in the 1998 
appropriations bill calling for a “full criminal background check” 
by the FBI.53
¶20 Although the en banc majority is correct that Congress has 
delegated the task of choosing the appropriate tools for the 
background check of a naturalization applicant, it overlooks the 
fact that the USCIS’s rate of technological development with 
regard to background checks may not live up to the original 
principle behind such delegations.
  The USCIS had no reasonable basis for relying on 
the FBI’s technology, given the certainty that it would not work 
fast enough to complete the name check on Mr. Aronov within the 
120-day deadline. 
54  Although the USCIS deserves 
deference as to its policy choices, such deference should not 
extend so far as to contradict both statute and regulation—to do so 
would be clearly unreasonable and unacceptable even under 
Chevron.55
¶21 The government’s response to the NNCP backlog was 
focused not on updating the FBI’s tools, but rather on providing 
enough resources to secure additional staff.
 
56
                                                     
51 Id. at 113. 
  Despite the 
inherently technological nature of the problem, the government 
ignored the more permanent solution of making important 
technological improvements like the BCS and wrap-around 
security checks, and stopped at securing more funding for 
52 Aronov v. Chertoff, 536 F.3d 30, 39 (1st Cir. 2008). 
53 Id. at 39–40; see 8 U.S.C. § 1446(a); 28 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006); see also 
Dep’ts of Commerce, Justice & State, the Judiciary & Related Agencies Act of 
1998, Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2440, 2448–49. 
54 See supra text accompanying note 40. 
55 See supra text accompanying note 29. 
56 2008 USCIS OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP., supra note 15, at 7. 
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personnel.  This choice reflects ominously on USCIS’s ability to 
deal with large workloads in the future.  The Ombudsman’s Report 
in 2007 pointed to three main concerns: 
(1) [M]ost USCIS adjudications processes are paper-
based; (2) existing USCIS information management 
systems do not provide robust data analysis tools necessary 
to monitor productivity and make changes when necessary; 
and (3) most USCIS information management systems are 
stand-alone systems with little or no interconnectivity.57
¶22 Moreover, the report expresses the overarching concern 
that comprehensive immigration reform could overwhelm USCIS’s 
information systems.
 
58
CONCLUSION 
   It is clear, therefore, that new investments 
in technology are needed to solve these problems.  
¶23 The USCIS is ill-equipped for future crises. The agency’s 
information technology falls far short of what is necessary to 
handle potential workload issues like the recently resolved NNCP 
backlog.  As the 2007 Ombudsman’s Report explains: 
USCIS remains entrenched in a cycle of continual planning 
with limited progress toward achieving its long-term 
transformation goals.  Until USCIS addresses this issue, the 
bureau will not be in a position to manage existing 
workloads or handle the potentially dramatic increase in 
immigration benefits processing workloads that could result 
from proposed immigration reform legislation.59
¶24 The intervening years have seen the USCIS triumphant 
over its elimination of the NNCP backlog, but largely silent on the 
topic of its technological transformation.  The backlog in Aronov 
may be gone, but the underlying sources of the problems remain 
inadequately addressed.  Until the USCIS takes the steps it 
 
                                                     
57 2007 USCIS OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 66. 
58 Id. at 11–12. 
59 Id. at 55 (quoting An Overview of Issues and Challenges Facing the 
Department of Homeland Security: Statement before the H. Comm. on 
Homeland Security (Feb. 7, 2007) (statement of Inspector General Richard L. 
Skinner, Dept. of Homeland Sec.) available at 
http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/testimony/OIGtm_RLS_020707.pdf  (last 
visited June 3, 2007). 
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considered but did not implement,60
                                                     
60 For example, the BCS and wrap-around security checks described in 2007 
USCIS OMBUDSMAN ANN. REP., supra note 9, at 66. 
 it will remain ill-equipped to 
handle new crises and prevent lawsuits like Aronov. 
